In May 1220 AD, Peter Constable of Melton appeared before the justices of the peace with an unusual complaint. He alleged that Muriel, the widow of his brother William, had asserted that not long before his death William had impregnated her. Peter went on to say that Muriel's claim was false and was being made so that he, Peter, should not inherit from his dead brother's estate. Muriel, called before the bench to answer the complaint, at once took the initiative. She requested that thejustices send to the sheriffof Norfolk a writ ordering per legales feminas diligenter faceret inquisicionem si esset pregnans nec ne, that with the help of legally qualified matrons he diligently investigate whether she was pregnant or not.8 This writ, or something similar, was later known as a writ de ventre inspiciendo, an inspection of the abdomen. The dozen or so worthy ladies who made such an examination at the direction of the court were often referred to as a jury of matrons.
But to return to the importunate Muriel. She came back to thejustices before the sheriff had made his report and again requested that she be examined for signs of pregnancy. This time they assigned the task to fourteen "worthy and discreet" London matrons. The latter reported that she was indeed with child. Thereupon thejustices told Muriel that she was free to go until another complaint was made. She did not have long to wait. Soon Peter was once more in court, again alleging that the widow was not pregnant by his brother.
Called before the bench, Muriel was questioned as to when she had last met her husband and when he died. The dates she gave were 24 May and 29 June 1220. Peter accepted these but, repeating his complaint, asked that the widow be held in custody, a precaution to prevent a false claim ofa delivery and the introduction ofthe newborn baby of another woman. The court, acceding, ordered that Muriel be placed in the keeping of the Lord Mayor ofLondon. Four London matrons were instructed to take charge of her.
Peter cannily bided his time until April 1221, forty-eight weeks after the date when, said Muriel, she had last seen her husband. No child had appeared, and he renewed his complaint before the justices. Muriel gave up, admitting she had not been pregnant. Her story now was that the previous year she had been ill and felt "so heavy in her sickness" that she thought she was with child. The court declared Peter the rightful heir ofWilliam.9
Thorne provides a translation of the form of one thirteenth-century de ventre writ. It directed that the woman be examined by lawful and discreet women through whom the truth may the better be known, and let the same women carefully [examine] her by feeling her breasts and abdomen and in every way whereby they may best ascertain whether she is pregnant or not. And if the said keepers and women discover that she is pregnant, or ifthey are in doubt, then let them lodge her in our castle, such a one, in such a way that no maid who may be pregnant nor any other who may be suspected ofcontriving a deception has access to her, and let her remain in the castle until the question of her offspring can be settled. And provide that in that castle she be separately guarded, lest any deception respecting her offspring occur while she is in custody. England, Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 201-203. A similar writ could be issued on the complaint of a brother and heir of the deceased if he believed that the widow was attempting to practise an excogitatam malitiam, a premeditated fraud. 1 An additional writ directed the sheriffnot to allow any pregnant woman to approach the widow in custody. This was to prevent the fraudulent introduction of another baby, particularly if "the heir might be a female child, and a substitution made of a male child, to take the inheritance under the English laws of primogeniture." II In February 1220, a few months before the Constable affair began, the writ de ventre had been invoked by one Thomas de Aldham against Joan, the widow of his brother Adam. This also was a matter of a contested inheritance. The examination for pregnancy was to be made by both knights and matrons, discreet and worthy; if the woman was found to be with child, the dates of conception and of probable delivery were to be established.'2 Henry de Bracton (d. 1268) , the great English jurist, was a Judge of the King's Bench, a Justice in Eyre, and Chancellor of Exeter Cathedral. He gives the form of various writs relating to suppositious birth; one of them specifies that coram praedictis militibius facias ean videri a praedictis mulieribus, in the presence of the aforesaid knights you cause her to be seen by the aforesaid women.13 Discreet and lawful women might be the experts in matters of pregnancy but their testimony before the justices would not be held as reliable as that of knights of the realm, who were usually noblemen and landowners.
There are records of the issue of the de ventre writ on three occasions in 1222. Each case involved disputed inheritance and examination by worthy matrons. The claim of Letitia, widow of William of Caynes, that she was pregnant was found to be correct. Matilda, widow of Richard Thorne, initially had said she was with child but later confessed that she was not, thus releasing Richard's estate to the rightful heirs. Agnes, widow of Richard of Tours, asserted that she was pregnant by her late husband. Indeed, she said she had rejoiced to feel foetal movements. The news was disputed by Avis, daughter ofAgnes and Richard, and by Roger Hyde, Avis's husband. He pointed out, with understandable concern, that ifAgnes should be pregnant and have a son, the son would inherit the estate, whereas a daughter would not. (The estate in this case was the fief ofa knight on half-pay.) So the court put Agnes in custody in a castle in Oxford and the fiefwas left in the hands ofone ofthejustices until the baby was born. Bracton, recording this case, was concerned with matters of law, not human interest; he does not tell us whether Agnes had a son or daughter. 14 and was sentenced to death, she could "plead her belly", that is, claim that she was pregnant. Should the court decide that she was telling the truth, execution ofsentence was deferred until she had delivered her child. The underlying principle, which had come down from Roman law and which had existed in English law from earliest times, was the protection of the life of the unborn infant. There were, however, three restrictions. illness of one day. On 5 January 1611, forty-one weeks and two days later, a little girl was born to his widow. During the preceding month and a half the wretched woman had been harrassed by her father-in-law. Driven to the streets, she was rescued when her labour began by a kindly female in whose home a baby girl was delivered. But the troubles of mother and daughter were not over. Eleven years later a suit was brought for their ejection from inherited land because, it was claimed, the child was illegitimate. The Court sought expert opinion from two Doctors of Physick, viz. Sir William Baddy and Doctor Mundford, and one Chamberlaine (who was a physician, and in nature of a Midwife) upon their Oath, they affirming that the child came in time convenient to be the Daughter of the party who died; And that the usual time for a Woman to go with child, was nine months and ten days, viz. menses Solares, that is thirty days to the month, and not menses Lunares, and that by reason of the want of strength in the woman or the child, or by reason of ill usage, she might be a longer time, Viz, to the end of ten months, or more. The Court held here, that it might well be as the Physicians had affirmed, that ten months may be said properly to be the time mulieribus pariendo constitutum [recognized as usual for pregnancy in women]
and instructed thejury that the little girl was indeed the legitimate daughter of Edmund Andrew.19 Grimston, citing precedents in this case, illustrates the primitive level of seventeenth-century forensic medicine. He refers to "a widow in Paris, that was delivered ofa child the fourteenth month after her husband's death, and yet the Judges awarded the child to be legitimate. The like judgment was given in the Consistory at Witenburgh, in case of a woman who was brought to bed in the eleventh month after her husband's death."20
William Theaker, husband of Mary, died on 15 February 1624. The widow, apparently not overcome with grief, "was married again to one John Duncomb within a week after the death of her husband." When Mary made it known that she was pregnant by William, Alphonsus Theaker, cousin of the dead man and his heir if John had no male child, induced the Court of Chancery to issue a writ de ventre inspiciendo. It directed the Sheriff of London to have Mary examined by a jury of matrons to determine not only whether she was pregnant but, if so, when she would deliver. Back came a report that the baby would be born within twenty weeks. Now on the strength ofanother writ Mary and her second husband were both moved to Wandsworth in charge ofthe sheriff. So that "there might not appear to be any false or suppositious birth", the complainant Theaker asked that Mary be isolated and be seen daily by court-appointed matrons. But such seclusion was not acceptable to the justices. Mary was a married woman, "a Feme-covert, who ought to habit with her husband". A third writ was issued directing that she would be left with her spouse; however, she had to promise that she would not leave the house, that one or two matrons could see her daily, and that two or three of them could attend her delivery. Once more Nature resolved the litigation; Mary, like Lady Willoughby, gave birth to a daughter.21
19 "Chamberlaine" was Peter Chamberlen the younger This seems to have been the last time that the de ventre writ was invoked in a matter of disputed inheritance. However, the possibility of reprieve on a plea of pregnancy was not forgotten by desperate women facing the gallows..A jury ordered to examine Ann Hurle, found guilty at the Old Bailey in 1804 of forgery, then a capital offence, could not make up its mind. The sheriff thereupon called in a physician, who found her not pregnant.28 In Norwich on 22 March 1832, a Friday, Mary Wright was found guilty of fatally poisoning her husband with arsenic. She was sentenced to be executed on the following Monday. Before the court could be adjourned, the prisoner's counsel requested a reprieve on the basis of her alleged pregnancy. The judge, said the London Medical Gazette, immediately directed the sheriff to summon ajury of matrons to inquire into the truth of the plea. Twelve married women were accordingly sworn to try whether the woman was pregnant with a quick child. The female jury and the prisoner retired into a private chamber; and in the course of an hour returned into court, and gave their verdict that the prisoner, Mary Wright, was not quick with child. Fortunately, the eyes of the profession in Norwich were not closed to the absurd nature of this transaction: three gentlemen, with the humanity which is seldom absent from minds of superior attainments, procured access to the prisoner next morning, examined her professionally, found her to be pregnant with a quick child, drew up a representation instantly for the judge, to the facts of which they were obliged to swear; and the consequence is that the woman stands reprieved from the execution of her sentence.
The surgeon-accoucheurs estimated that Mrs Wright was in her fifth month. She delivered a healthy daughter on 11 July.
Notwithstanding the Gazette's somewhat self-righteous posture, its criticisms were justified. The decision, said the journal, should not have been entrusted to "such female stragglers and idlers as chance finds present in a criminal court on such an occasion. Such persons must be, literally, loungers and idlers." But not even intelligent matrons could always be accurate in a diagnosis which was sometimes difficult for the experienced accoucheur, nor could they necessarily determine whether the child was quick, a question that might challenge even the professional man. The Gazette also took issue with the law's inclusion of quickness as a requirement for a reprieve, since it made invalid a prisoner's plea of pregnancy in the months before quickening. Finally, the editor raised the question of the determination of pregnancy in relation to inheritance. "Can there be any rational solution why, if a foetus be held unendowed with life until quickening has occurred, that very same foetus is yet held capable of inheritance from the moment of its conception? In other words, an embryo, by the laws of real property, may succeed to an estate, and yet, in three or four months later, be put to death for its mother's crime!"29 The dispute as to when life begins is not a new one.
When Anne Wycherley, a few years later, was sentenced to death for the murder of her young daughter, she replied, "I am with child now." Ordered the judge, "Let the sheriff impanel a jury of matrons forthwith. Let all the doors be shut, and no one be suffered to leave the Court", this last apparently a precaution to prevent a rapid exodus of married ladies. Twelve of them were impanelled and the forematron [sic] colleagues were duly sworn to "diligently inquire, search, and try Anne Wycherley, the prisoner at the bar, whether she be quick with child or not". A bailiff was sworn to "keep this jury ofmatrons without meat, drink, or fire, candle light excepted; you shall suffer no person but the prisoner to speak to them .."
Shortly after the prisoner andjury retired, the Court received a message that the help of a surgeon was desired. The women were brought back into court to repeat their request. A surgeon-accoucheur, present in court as a witness in another case, was startled to find himself ordered to examine a prisoner in private. His wife attending as an onlooker, fared no better-she was chosen as forematron of the jury. Upon his return, he stated under oath that "he saw no reason to believe that the prisoner was quick with child, his opinion being that she was not with child at all, but that if she was, she could only be in a very early stage of pregnancy." The Court then called attention to a nice legal distinction: "'Quick with child' is having conceived. 'With quick child' is when the child has quickened."30 The jury of matrons returned a verdict that Anne
Wycherley was not quick with child. However, she was subsequently given a reprieve "in order that it might be ascertained with certainty whether she was with child or not." Unhappily, the outcome seems not to have been recorded.3'
The British Medical Association in August 1843 unanimously passed a resolution condemning the law under which the sentence of death could be delayed if a pregnant prisoner had quickened but offered no mercy if she had not done so, "thus making a distinction where there is no difference".32
A reprieve on the grounds of pregnancy was requested after a trial in 1843; the matrons found the prisoner not pregnant.33 In 1847, a jury of matrons was directed to examine Mary Ann Hunt, a convicted murderer. The assistance of a surgeon was offered if the jury desired it. The matrons, declining, returned to court in half an hour. Their verdict was against the prisoner.
Mr. Baron Platt.-You say that she is not quick with child-that she has not a living child within her?
Forematron.-That is our verdict. We are all of that opinion. Mr. Baron Platt-Let the prisoner be removed. The law must take its course.
Fortunately, the Secretary of State intervened, ordering an examination by experienced medical men. They decided that Mary Ann Hunt was pregnant "and had passed that stage at which quickening (foetal movement) is most commonly perceived." She was given a respite, and three months later delivered a healthy seven months' son. Meanwhile, her sentence had been commuted to transportation for life. Again, the medical press was outraged, "by a law which virtually leaves the issue in the hands of ignorant and incompetent persons."34 30 That is, when it has moved (Henry C. Black, Black's law dictionary, St Paul, Minn., West, 1968 West, , p. 1415 Mary Weeks, indicted in 1856 for murder, was found by a jury of matrons and two physicians to be pregnant. Sentence was postponed.35
Rachel Busby, under sentence by an Oxford Court in 1872 and found not pregnant by the matrons, would have died "but for the exertions of some philanthropic gentlemen". She subsequently delivered a stillborn baby in the county gaol.36
In the same year, the notorious Christiana Edmunds, already five months in prison before her trial, was arraigned at the Old Bailey on a charge of wilfully murdering a four-year-old boy by giving him a chocolate cream containing strychnine. It was proved that she had bought the poison from a pharmacist in Brighton and that on several occasions she had induced various young boys to purchase chocolate creams for her. The woman had attempted unsuccessfully to poison other children. There was a familial history of insanity, and several medical men who had examined the prisoner testified as to her apparent inability to distinguish right from wrong.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and Christiana Edmunds was sentenced to death. She then stated that she was pregnant. Said the Medical Times and Gazette:
The Sheriff was directed forthwith to empanel a jury of matrons, and in obedience to this injunction a raid was made by the Under-Sheriffs upon the matrons present in Court. A dozen respectably dressed women were marched into the jury-box and sworn, with a forewoman of course. They then retired with the prisoner into the judge's parlour to consider their verdict. The result is well known; the prisoner was not quick with child.... Half an hour after their retirement a messenger came into Court, and an inquiry was made for an accoucheur. One was found Mr. J. Beresford Ryley, of Woolwich-and he was directed to assist the matrons. Some further delay occurred. It is rumoured that a policeman was sent for a stethoscope, but brought a telescope instead. At length the jury returned, and the brief verdict "Not" was returned .... The period of quickening is selected as that after which the convict may be respited, because it was formerly the opinion of Medical men-and is even now the opinion of the vulgar-that the foetus only receives life when the woman quickens. Quickening is now known to be such an extremely uncertain sign, occurring at such varying periods during the pregnant state, that the audible pulsation of the foetal heart is invariably substituted, and this can be ascertained by none other than a Medical examination.
The sentence of death on Christiana Edmunds was eventually remitted on the grounds of insanity.37
A few years later, another convicted prisoner similarly pleaded her pregnancy. The judge again directed that a jury of women be taken from among those casually present in court (de circumstantibus); and they were sworn to try not only whether the convict was pregnant, but whether she was quick with child or not. The learned judge who tried the case very properly directed that the surgeon of the gaol, Dr. McEwen, should be associated with the twelve matrons or discreet women required by law. He was sworn to assist the jury; and, after due consultation, they returned a verdict that the woman was It should be appreciated that "pleading the belly" was a relatively uncommon occurrence. The case ofCatherine Webster illustrates the point. When she made her plea for a stay ofexecution on 19 July 1879 at the Old Bailey, thejudge, Mr Justice Denman, observed that this was his first experience of the sort in thirty-two years on the bench. A jury of matrons was assembled from women in the gallery and was sworn: "You shall search and try whether the prisoner be with child-quick child, and return a true verdict according to the best of your skill and judgment."
After consulting with a Mr Avory, an experienced lawyer, the judge sent for the matron ofthe gaol. At this point, Catherine Webster appeared on the verge ofcollapse. It was the opinion of the matron that the prisoner was "not quick" with child. Next, at the direction ofMr Justice Denman, Mr Bond, a surgeon who was present, and the jury ofmatrons retired to the jury room. "To them was taken the prisoner, who was assisted by two female warders, she now being in a prostrate condition."
The convicted woman was examined and then was returned to the court with the surgeon and the jury of matrons. Note that Mr Bond here used the phrase "not quick with child", meaning that he had not detected the foetal movements that usually appear in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy. The jury ofmatrons, having now heard the opinions of the matron of the gaol and of the surgeon and having themselves examined the prisoner, were instructed by the judge to reach a verdict. They deliberated for two or three minutes without leaving their seats and then stated their conclusion that the prisoner was not "with child-quick child".39
Catherine Webster was hanged at Wandsworth Prison on 29 July 1879. There was a inquest as required by law but, unfortunately, no autopsy.40 Justice Denman's initial instruction to thejury ofmatrons, to "search and try whether the prisoner be with child-quick child" could be taken as ambiguous. Was the prisoner simply pregnant or had she reached the fourth or fifth month when foetal movements can usually be detected? However, the law was specific: if the jury of matrons "bring in their verdict quick with child, (for, barely with child, unless it be alive in the womb, is not sufficient,) execution shall be stayed generally till the next session [ The role of the medical witness is an ancient one. The juries of matrons in the thirteenth century must have been among the very first to state medical opinions in courts of law. In our day, of course, jury members render a verdict but do not give testimony; thus by modem definition a juryman or jurywoman cannot be a witness. But in the Middle Ages, members ofajury were expected to know or to obtain the facts of a case and then reach their verdict; there were no witnesses as such.42 As medicine slowly advanced in later centuries, the authority of the medical man grew but the law regarding proof ofpregnancy for long remained unchanged. Not until the latter part of the nineteenth century does the jury of matrons seem to have been superseded by the medical man.43
When a woman under sentence of death claimed pregnancy and the physical signs were uncertain, the evaluation of her state must have been harrowing for the medical witness ofany century. A decision that the prisoner was indeed expecting a child would bring a respite from the rope, an interval in which new evidence and new witnesses could be sought, some time in which to seek a pardon. And perhaps, in spite of the sentence, the matron or midwife or doctors still secretly doubted the guilt of the condemned woman. The years rolled on; not until 1931 was the Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act passed, directing that if a trial jury decided on the basis of medical evidence that a woman convicted of a capital offence was pregnant, she must be sentenced to life imprisonment. "The ancient right formerly possessed by a woman to move in arrest of execution" was withdrawn. 
